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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kim J. Day appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of sixteen. Mr. Day now appeals, and he asserts that he was denied his 
right to due process because of a fatal variance between the charging document and 
the jury instructions. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
K.S., who was thirteen at the time of trial, is Mr. Day's stepdaughter. (Tr., p.132, 
Ls.8-19.) Her mother, Kristy Day, was married to Mr. Day. (Tr., p.134, Ls.1-6.) K.S. 
testified that in November or December, 2007, Mr. Day touched her "private parts" while 
they were in the hot tub together. (Tr., p.135, Ls.1-13.) She and Mr. Day would play 
"ice wars," which was, "when you take ice cubes into the hot tub and stick them down 
each other's pants." (Tr., p.135, Ls.19-21.) K.S. testified that Mr. Day would try to put 
ice down her bikini and that she would stick her hand down in his pants to put the ice 
there. (Tr., p.137, L.14 - p.139, L.4.) Around Christmastime, K.S. told Mr. Day that she 
no longer wanted to play the game, because Mr. Day had, "stuck his hands down my 
pants and said that he lost the ice 'cause it had melted, and he felt around my private 
parts." (Tr., p.143, Ls.5-7.) She also testified that on that same occasion, "I had stuck 
the snowball down his pants, and he grabbed my - the elbow part of my arm and stuck 
it further down," so that she felt his penis. (Tr., p.143, L.25 - p.144, L.5.) When she 
told Mr. Day that she no longer wanted to play the game, according to K.S., he said, 
"okay, just don't mention anything to your mom." (Tr., p.145, Ls.21-22.) K.S. never told 
any adults about the alleged incidents until almost two years later. (Tr., p.155, Ls.8-15.) 
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K.S.'s friend, S.P., testified that she had seen Mr. Day put ice down K.S.'s 
swimming suit while in the hot tub. (Tr., p.162, Ls.5-24.) She also testified that she had 
seen Mr. Day touch K.S.'s breasts in the hot tub. (Tr., p.163, Ls.22-24.) 
Justin Dance, a detective with the Bingham County Sheriff's Office, testified next. 
(Tr., p.167, Ls.8-12.) He was assigned to the case in October, 2010. (Tr., p.168, LS.10-
14.) During an interview with Mr. Day, Mr. Day confirmed that he and K.S. played the 
"ice wars" game, and that his hand may have touched K.S.'s private parts while trying to 
put snow down her swimming suit, but that any touching was accidental. (Tr., p.177, 
L.1 - p.178, L.8.) A redacted recording of this interview was played for the jury. 
(Tr., p.193, Ls.13-14; Plaintiff's Exhibit D.) The State rested. 
Mr. Day testified next. (Tr., p.203, Ls.16-19.) He testified that the kids came up 
with the idea of the "ice wars," where "everybody would just cool everybody off by 
throwing the ice on each other or a cup of ice water. But the implements of that game 
were different depending on the age "cause if you were older, you had a better 
advantage than you would if you were younger." (Tr., p.207. Ls.18-23.) Mr. Day denied 
ever having put his hands down K.S.'s shirt or fondling her breasts. (Tr., p.210, LS.17-
19.) He also testified that the game was never sexual in nature. (Tr., p.211, Ls.8-17.) 
Mr. Day also testified that he never had K.S. touch his penis. (Tr., p.214. LS.9-
13.) Mr. Day explained that he had cancer in his genitals and had experience a 
"hardening of the varicose seal on my testicle," which would create, "a burning 
sensation. If you were to touch my testicle on the front side of my testicle, I would have 
an immense amount of pain," and he did not want anyone to touch his testicles. 
(Tr., p.216, Ls.5-20.) Mr. Day testified that he did not tell Detective Dance this 
information because, "I was terrified. I had no idea what, what this would entail, and I'm 
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a little bit familiar with the system." (Tr., p.219, Ls.1S-20.) Mr. Day's wife, Kristy Day, 
testified during the State's rebuttal case that Mr. Day had never complained about this 
pain, but the parties stipulated to the admission of Exhibit E, which indicated that 
Mr. Day had a cyst. (Tr., p.232, Ls.3 - p.234, L.3.) 
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of lewd conduct - the jury 
was instructed that the State must prove, "the defendant, Kim J. Day, committed an act 
or acts of manual-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the 
body of {K.S.]." (Tr., p. 236, L.23 - p.237, L.1 (emphasis added).) No objection was 
made to this instruction. (Tr., p.19S, L.20 - p.201, L.7.) 
Mr. Day was found guilty. (Tr., p.262, Ls.21-23.) He then admitted to a 
persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.264, Ls.19-20.) The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years determinate. (Tr., p.295, Ls.6-S.) 
Mr. Day appealed, and he asserts that the district court erred by improperly instructing 
the jury on the elements of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of lewd 
conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The JUry On The Elements Of Lewd 
Conduct 
A. Introduction 
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of lewd conduct - the jury 
was instructed that the State must prove, "the defendant, Kim J. Day, committed an act 
or acts of manual-genital contact or any other lewd or lascivious act upon or with the 
body of [K.S.]." (Tr., p. 236, L.23 - p.237, L.1 (emphasis added).) Because Mr. Day 
was only charged with manual-genital contact in the Information (R., pp.41-42), the 
italicized language created a fatal variance. It also incorrectly defined lewd conduct, 
essentially allowing Mr. Day to be convicted of lewd conduct for an act that would not 
constitute actual lewd conduct. 
B. The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of 
Lewd Cond uct 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Day acknowledges that no objection was made to 
this jury instruction. Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error. 
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Pursuant to Perry, a defendant must 
demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) 
there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not 
contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant's substantial 
rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. Mr. Day meets all the prongs of this test. 
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Day's right to due process. Mr. Day 
was charged only with lewd conduct committed by manual-genital contact. (Tr., p.125, 
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Ls.6-17; R., pp.41-42.) However, the elements instruction expanded the acts for Mr. 
Day could be found guilty by adding the phrase, "or any other lewd or lascivious act 
upon or with the body of [K.S.]." The instruction thus added an additional means by 
which the jury could have found Mr. Day guilty. "A trial court has the duty to properly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case before it." Weinstein v. Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010). The instructions to the jury must 
match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by which a defendant is 
alleged to have committed the crime charged. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 
(2007). If they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and 
the charging document. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011). A fatal variance is a 
due process violation. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937), State v. 
Chapa, 127 Idaho 786,790 (Ct. App. 1995). Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. Day's 
unwaived constitutional rights. 
Further, the only other evidence of inappropriate conduct that the jury heard was 
the allegation that Mr. Day had touched K.S.'s breasts. And this conduct does not 
amount to lewd conduct. The crime of lewd conduct with a minor specifically includes 
several types of sexual contact, including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, 
anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact. 
I.C. § 18-1508. In State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a prepubescent girl constituted lewd 
conduct. The Court held that it did not because the type of conduct included in the 
phrase "including but not limited to" must be the conduct of a like or similar class or 
character to the types of conduct specifically listed. Id. at 486-87. 
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It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Day based 
on conduct other than manual-genital contact. This type of activity is not only different 
from that with which Mr. Day was originally charged, but is not conduct that constitutes 
the type of crime charged. The only type of conduct for which Mr. Day could lawfully 
have been convicted was manual-genital contact, even if the jury believed that he 
engaged in other touching with the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires. 
Touching the breast area would not constitute the crime of lewd conduct. Thus, giving 
this instruction violated Mr. Day's right to due process. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The law is clear that he 
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the 
means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and that if 
they do not, there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging 
document. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011). The jury instruction is in the 
record, so there is no need for additional information outside the record. Further, there 
is no evidence that the failure to object to the instruction was a strategic decision, as 
Mr. Day gained absolutely no strategic advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to 
convict him on uncharged conduct that does not meet the definition of lewd conduct. 
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence of manual-genital contact, the jury also 
heard evidence that Mr. Day had touched K.S.'s breasts. Regarding the manual-genital 
conduct, Mr. Day testified that any touching was incidental touching that occurred while 
playing the "ice wars" game. The jury could have believed that Mr. Day had simply 
inadvertently had manual genital contact but willfully touched K.S.'s breasts. Further, 
the prosecutor, while discussing the elements of lewd conduct during closing argument, 
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specifically argued, "S.P. told you that he stuck his hand inside [K.S.'s] bikini top and 
touched her breast." (Tr., p.245, Ls.7-12.) The jury was left with the impression that it 
could convict Mr. Day based upon the touching of K.S.'s breast. 
Because the giving of this instruction violated Mr. Day's right to due process, and 
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Day's 
conviction must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Day requests that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 2012. 
JUSTIN M.C1JR1TS\" 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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